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I.

INTRODUCTION
An undocumented immigrant is arrested, sitting in a Rikers prison cell, and, as a matter of law,

a criminal facing deportation. He is only seventeen has been transient, depending on a resistant
sibling for shelter or living on the streets. He is detained for two months without ever speaking to
an attorney, and, upon release, is immediately picked up by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”), designated as an unaccompanied minor, and transferred into the custody of
the Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”). He is examined by a psychiatrist who determines
that his cognitive functions are severely impaired. He struggles to communicate but eventually
reveals a long history of physical abuse and a solitary, traumatic journey from his home in Mexico
to New York at the age of ten. He has no family willing to care for him, struggles in school due to
his limited comprehension, and eventually resorts to petty theft in order to eat.
Once in ORR custody, he has an opportunity to meet an immigration attorney who assesses
his eligibility for relief, but his mental deteriorates rapidly. He does not remember dates and details,
although his account of the abuse he has endured remains consistent. His journey to legal status
has just begun, but his experiences and trauma will continue to present obstacles moving forward.1
What he has endured is, unfortunately, not unique. Instead, it is indicative of the experiences
and challenges faced by undocumented children in the United States. In the increasingly hostile
political climate for immigrants, the absence of protections and the promulgation of restrictive
policies have left more and more children in immigration custody in administrative limbo.2 Those
policies have stripped those not in custody of the guaranteed representation necessary to make

1

SUSAN J. TERRIO, WHOSE CHILD AM I? UNACCOMPANIED, UNDOCUMENTED CHILDREN IN U.S. IMMIGRATION
CUSTODY 175-80 (University of California Press) (2015). The facts from this anecdote reflect the story of an actual
child documented in Terrio’s book. She conducted a series of interviews with the child’s case manager, foster mother,
and attorney, reviewed confidential legal files, and attended an immigration hearing to piece together an account of
the child’s story.
2
Vivian Yee & Miriam Jordan, Migrant Children in Search of Justice: A 2-Year Old’s Day in Immigration Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/migrant-children-family-separation-court.html.
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any—let alone an effective—claim for relief.3 Expected to state and defend their claims for relief,
immigrant children are facing linguistic, cultural, intellectual, and psychological hurdles on their
path to legal status against the legal expertise of government attorneys.4
In a system where a person’s future is often entirely dependent on a finding of credibility,5
children bear the heavy burden of proving that they are eligible for and legally entitled to
immigration relief.6 The immigration courts decidedly depart from the safeguards recognized in
the United States criminal and juvenile systems and, instead, steadfastly commit to a rigid
framework delineated by the INA.7 Despite children’s unique vulnerabilities, “immigration courts
make no allowance for developmental immaturity, cultural incapacity, or special vulnerability”
and “lack meaningful safeguards for children [. . .] with mental disorders and cognitive
impairments who are in removal proceedings.”8 While the criminal and juvenile delinquency court
systems have recognized and evolved as awareness has increased regarding the impacts of age and
competency,9 the immigration system lags far behind. This paper argues that, where the American
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Id.
Id. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 dismantled what was then the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(“INS”) and created three separate immigration enforcement agencies: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”). 6 U.S.C.A. §
251. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 restructured the Department of Homeland Security with the stated intention
of combatting the risks posed by terrorism, including the “exploitable liability” of open borders. H.R. REP. NO. 107609, at 64 (2002). The creation of separate arms of DHS’s immigration enforcement infrastructure leaves USCIS
charged with the adjudication of immigrant visa petitions, naturalization petitions, asylum and refugee applications,
and all other immigration benefits. 6 U.S.C.A. § 271. Further, the Act delegated authority for the care and treatment
of immigrant children in federal custody to the Office of Refugee Resettlement. 6 U.S.C.A. § 279.
5
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2019).
6
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2019). The one form of relief available specifically to children, Special Immigrant
Juvenile Status (“SIJS”), requires that a child be dependent on the State and unable to reunify with one or both parents
because of abuse, abandonment, or neglect. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). Even though SIJS recognizes the unique
position faced by immigrant children, its recognition does not extend beyond the single immigration application
designated for these abandoned, abused, and neglected children. Id. Furthermore, this special classification still does
not confer on immigrant children a right to a government-funded representative outside of the family or juvenile court
setting. Id.
7
TERRIO, supra note 1, at 162.
8
Id.
9
See, e.g., Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Roper v. Simmons, 542
U.S. 551 (2005).
4
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immigration system fails to recognize the developmental needs of children and mandate
government-funded representation and protections for them, children in immigration proceedings
are deprived of access to the relief to which they are entitled and, thus, to procedural due process.
Part I of this paper provides an overview of the body of laws governing immigration
proceedings and, specifically, children. Part II discusses the scholarly literature and examines the
two primary theoretical bases for which scholars have argued for government-funded
representation: a constitutional argument and a children’s rights-based approach. Part III explores
the rationales and approaches adopted in the criminal, family, and juvenile delinquency systems.
Part IV discusses studies that have delved into questions of children’s brains and cognitive
development and the legal implications. Part V concludes by proposing recommendations for the
redress of immigration law’s weaknesses in the treatment of children.
II. LEGAL AUTHORITIES
Courtrooms, by their nature, invoke a sense of apprehension, uncertainty, and, often, fear.10
The room is arranged to be adversarial, with a single judge or panel of judges positioned in front
of the parties to the proceeding, regardless of whether the proceedings are legally adversarial or
administrative. 11 Despite the potentially severe consequences of an adverse immigration decision,
the law deems immigration proceedings to be civil actions.12 This classification effectively denies
respondents in immigration proceedings the right to government-funded counsel that is afforded
to criminal or delinquent defendants under the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel and the
Constitution’s guarantees of procedural due process and fundamental fairness.13 In defending the
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See, e.g., Julia Preston, Young and Alone, Facing Court and Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2012,
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/us/more-young-illegal-immigrants-face-deportation.html.
11
See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
12
Id. at 1038.
13
Id.
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classification of removal proceedings as civil in nature, the Supreme Court reasoned in I.N.S. v.
Lopez-Mendoza that the purpose of a deportation proceeding is to determine eligibility to remain
in the United States and not to punish unlawful presence, although the Court did acknowledge that
a “judge’s sole power is to order deportation.”14 This paper argues that immigration proceedings
fit squarely into legal frameworks adapted to criminal and delinquency law, and as such, the
constitutional interests at stake are more akin to those of a criminal or juvenile dependent than a
party to an administrative proceeding. This section provides a general overview of some of the
legal frameworks that govern the processes undergone by undocumented immigrant children.
A. THE CONSTITUTION
The reality of the American immigration system is that immigration courts increasingly mirror
and are intertwined with the criminal system.15 The costs of adverse immigration decisions can
result in life-altering consequences and losses of liberty and opportunity.16 Unlike the criminal
system, a right to government-funded counsel17 does not apply to immigrant respondents.18
Despite the liberty interests at stake in immigration and removal proceedings, the courts have

14

Id.
See Won Kidane, Revisiting the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Applicable in Adversarial Administrative
Deportation Proceedings: Lessons from the Department of Labor Rules of Evidence, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 108
(2007) (explaining that “[d]eportation itself not only increasingly looks like a criminal punishment, but also the
proceeding itself now shares some of the most fundamental characteristics of a criminal proceedings”). The overlap
between the criminal system and qualification for most forms of immigration relief renders any claim that the two
bodies of law are separate and apart moot. Id. Even relatively minor offenses classified as “crimes of moral turpitude”
may carry with them the possibility of deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(1)(2)(A)(i) (2019). The Immigration Court
frequently interprets criminal law in order to determine eligibility for immigration relief, often resting immigration
decisions on the same evidence used to reach decisions in criminal prosecutions. Kidane, supra note 16, at 110.
16
Shani M. King, Child Migrants and America’s Evolving Immigration Mission, 32 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 59, 88-89
(2019). (“While violence is a significant "push factor" behind recent migrant surges, so too is poverty and fleeing
migrants desire to reconnect with family members in the United States. In addition to ranking among the world's most
dangerous places, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador are also among the poorest--with more than one-third of
employed people surviving on incomes of less than $ 4 a day. Thus, while many UACs have valid claims for political
asylum or other forms of humanitarian relief and are thus entitled to remain in the country, others do not. Such a mixed
flow of migrants poses significant challenges to the American immigration system, which must balance the need to
maintain border controls with the responsibility to protect genuinely vulnerable children.”).
17
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
18
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012).
15
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maintained that, because of the civil classification of immigration law, an absence of counsel does
not automatically equate to a denial of procedural due process and fundamental fairness.19
Because the Court’s Sixth Amendment interpretations have limited a right to governmentfunded counsel to criminal and delinquency defendants,20 the Courts have rarely found access to
counsel claims viable in the immigration context.21 Indeed, courts have only found a violation of
an immigrant’s right to counsel in immigration proceedings where the immigration courts entirely
denied the respondent access to counsel.22 This is because the right of access to counsel in this
context is limited to the rights to a reasonable opportunity to find counsel,23 to have counsel present
in the courtroom,24 and against deprivation of counsel based on personal animosities.25
The Supreme Court has not construed the Fifth Amendment’s provision of procedural due
process to guarantee a right to counsel in administrative cases such as immigration proceedings.26
The Court adopted a three-factor balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge27 assess what process is

See, e.g., Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1975) (“In petitioner’s case the absence of counsel
at his hearing before the Immigration Judge did not deprive his deportation proceeding of fundamental fairness. . .
The lack of counsel before the Immigration Judge did not prevent full administrative consideration of his argument.
Counsel could have obtained no different administrative result. ‘Fundamental fairness,’ therefore, was not abridged
during the administrative proceedings, and the order of deportation is not subject to constitutional attack for a lack of
due process.”).
20
See, e.g., Lopez-Mendoza, supra note 11 (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to a
respondent in an immigration proceeding); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34 (1967) (holding that individuals in juvenile
court are entitled to specific due process guarantees, including the right to meaningful representation of counsel).
21
See, e.g., Castro-Nuno v. I.N.S., 577 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 2012) (determining that the respondent had been unjustly
denied a right to counsel after the immigration judge flatly refused to continue a deportation hearing to allow him to
locate counsel).
22
Note, The Right to Be Heard From Immigration Prisons: Locating a Right of Access to Counsel for Immigration
Detainees in the Right of Access to Courts, 132 HARV. L. REV. 726, 731 (2018).
23
See, e.g., Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that aliens must be provided with
reasonable time to locate counsel and to allow counsel to prepare for the hearing).
24
See, e.g., Castro-Nuno, supra note 21, at 579 (determining that the respondent had been unjustly denied a right to
counsel after the immigration judge refused to continue a deportation hearing to allow him to locate counsel).
25
See, e.g., Baltazar-Alcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding deprivation of right to counsel where
immigration judge denied respondent access to attorney because of the judge’s negative opinion about attorney).
26
Henriques v. I.N.S., 465 F.2d 119, 120 n.3 (2d Cir. 1972) (“[W]e can agree with, and follow, the majority in
Argersinger and Gideon, each involving the sixth amendment and criminal cases, without reaching a blanket rule that
the fifth amendment requires, as a matter of due process, counsel for indigent aliens in deportation cases, regardless
of their nature.”).
27
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
19
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due to an individual once a protected liberty interest is found to be implicated in an administrative
case. The Mathews test balances three distinct elements of the analysis: (1) the individual’s private
interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that
interest and the probable value of the procedural safeguard; and (3) the government’s interests at
stake, such as costs and burdens of implementation of the safeguard.28 The Court explained: “The
essence of due process is the requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given]
notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.’ …All that is necessary is that the
procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to the capacities and circumstances of
those who are to be heard’ …to [e]nsure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present
their case.”29 However, the Mathews test has been criticized for often skewing the balancing of
interests in favor of the government and for its inadequacy in addressing the “Civil Gideon” issue,
i.e., the basic procedural right to counsel.30
Despite the shortcomings of the Mathews test, the courts have consistently applied this
standard to assess whether a right to counsel would be necessary to satisfy the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments’ requirements of due process and fundamental fairness.31 In Lassiter v. Dep’t of
Social Services of Durham County, N.C., the Supreme Court held that the due process requirement
of “fundamental fairness” mandates a right to appointed counsel when a litigant may be deprived

28

Id. at 334-35.
Id. at 348-50.
30
Stan Keillor, James H. Cohen, & Mercy Changwesha, The Inevitable, if Untrumpeted, March Toward “Civil
Gideon”, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 469, 481 (2014) (“The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test not only ignores the
dignitary value of added process, but also skews the result in favor of governmental interests. As Reich points out,
‘Mathews v. Eldridge represents an outlook that treats the government’s claims as having greater urgency than the
claims of individuals.’ This may be an appropriate approach for incremental safeguards, such as the right to present
post-hearing argument. But it is completely inadequate for a protection as fundamental as the assistance of counsel in
an adversarial proceeding. …The inadequacy of the Mathews v. Eldridge test in this context is illustrated by both
Lassiter and Turner.”).
31
See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981) (using the Mathews test
to analyze a right to counsel in termination of parental rights cases); Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) (using the
Mathews test to analyze a right to counsel in civil contempt proceedings); Aguilera-Enriquez, supra note 19 (using
the Mathews test to analyze a right to counsel in immigration proceedings).
29
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of his physical liberty.32 The Court in Lassiter, a termination of parental rights case, denied the
parents a right to counsel and emphasized a presumption against a right to counsel where there
was no threat of incarceration, citing a number of criminal cases in which the Court determined
the scope of the Sixth Amendment right.33 Seemingly conflating the limitations of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel with the scope of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ procedural
rights, the Court established a limited procedural right to counsel where the personal interest at
stake is the person’s freedom,34 effectively making the Mathews analysis of private interests a
comparison between of civil and criminal liberty interests.35 However, the Court’s emphasis on
physical liberty interests in Lassiter has opened the door for respondents in immigration
proceedings who face the possibility of detention or removal from the United States,36 with some
courts even arguing that freedom from immigration detention and the “significant risk that the
individual will be needlessly deprived of the fundamental right to liberty” were at the core of the
liberty interests imagined in the Constitution’s due process procedural rights.37
Notably, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that removal is a severe penalty akin to the
interests at stake in a criminal proceeding, although not a criminal sanction in a strict sense.38
Although immigration law’s proximity to the criminal system has not compelled the Court to
acknowledge a Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel, the Court in Padilla v. Kennedy
acknowledged that immigrants in criminal proceedings have a Sixth Amendment right to effective

32

Lassiter, supra note 31, at 26-27.
Id. at 25-27.
34
Id.
35
Stan Keillor, et al, supra note 30, at 482.
36
See, e.g., Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2017).
37
Id. at 993.
38
Padilla v. Kennedy, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010).
33
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counsel,

39

reasoning that the Court’s ruling in Strickland40 applied to a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel where the collateral consequence of the representation was deportation.41
While a right to effective assistance of counsel in immigration proceedings has not been recognized
by the Supreme Court, the First Circuit in Lozada v. I.N.S. has recognized a narrow window for
these claims42; where, due to ineffective representation, “the proceeding was so fundamentally
unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case,” an immigrant respondent
may have a viable procedural due process claim.43
The Bureau of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) set out a strict framework for assessing whether
a noncitizen has a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, requiring a showing of the
client’s agreement with counsel and how the attorney did not comply with that agreement,
requiring that the attorney be informed of and allowed to respond to the claims, and mandating
that the complaint be filed with the attorney’s professional disciplinary authority.44 Despite the
Lozada court’s limited recognition of a potential right to effective representation, some scholars
have argued that “access to counsel could be protected under the right to effective assistance of
counsel, because if you cannot access your lawyer, presumably she cannot assist you
effectively.”45 However, the courts have not adopted this view, and due process claims by
noncitizen litigants who are unable to procure counsel have generally proven unsuccessful under
Lozada’s stringent standards.46

39

Id.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing a standard for Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance
of counsel claims).
41
Padilla, supra note 38, at 366.
42
See Lozada v. I.N.S., 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988).
43
Id. at 13.
44
Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (1988).
45
Note, The Right to Be Heard From Immigration Prisons: Locating a Right of Access to Counsel for Immigration
Detainees in the Right of Access to Courts, supra note 22, at 732.
46
See, e.g., Nikollbibaj v. Gonzales, 232 Fed.Appx. 546, 554-55 (6th Cir. 2007).
40
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B. THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the statutory authority for immigration law,
provides that a noncitizen has “the privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government,
by counsel of the alien’s choosing . . . .”47 The INA further provides an alien the right to “have a
reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against [them], to present evidence on [their] own
behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government . . . .”48 The limited rights
conferred by the INA are effectively inaccessible to respondents in immigration proceedings where
the statutes do not confer a simultaneous right to government-funded counsel.49
The courts have increasingly recognized that constitutional rights and liberty interests can be
implicated in immigration proceedings.50 The Ninth Circuit has held that “accurate and just results
are most likely to be obtained through equal contest of opposed interests” in the court’s adversarial
setting, affirming a public policy interest in ensuring effective representation for litigants with a
liberty interest at stake.51 Moreover, in applying the Mathews test, the Ninth Circuit has recognized
that “the government has no legitimate interest in detaining individuals who have been determined
not to be a danger in the community and whose appearance at further immigration proceedings can
be reasonably ensured.”52 The “significant risk that [an] individual will be needlessly deprived of
the fundamental right to liberty” are at the core of the liberty interests imagined in the
Constitution’s conferral of procedural due process rights.53 Thus, the courts consideration of
whether the appointment of counsel for an indigent noncitizen would be necessary to satisfy the

47

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012).
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2012).
49
See Aguilera-Enriquez, supra note 19, at 571-72 (DeMascio, J., dissenting).
50
See, e.g., Aguilera-Enriquez, supra note 19; Hernandez, supra note 37; Lozada, supra note 42, at 13.
51
Lassiter, supra note 31, at 28.
52
Hernandez, supra note 36, at 993.
53
Id.
48
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Fifth Amendment’s requirements of “fundamental fairness” and procedural due process was a
logical step in the analysis of immigrants’ constitutional rights.54
In Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, the Sixth Circuit examined whether an immigrant respondent was
constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel during his deportation hearing.55 The Court
conceded that if a provision of the INA were not to provide an alien with procedural due process,
the statutory requirements of the INA would have to “yield [to] the constitutional guarantee of due
process [and] must provide adequate protection during the deportation process.”56 “The test for
whether due process requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent alien is whether, in a
given case, the assistance of counsel would be necessary to provide ‘fundamental fairness the
touchstone of due process.’”57 The Court determined that, where assistance of counsel could not
have resulted in a different decision by the Immigration Judge, the lack of counsel “did not prevent
full administrative consideration of his argument.”58 Thus, fundamental fairness “was not
abridged, and the order of deportation [was] not subject to constitutional attack for a lack of due
process.”59 The Sixth Circuit’s decision, although denying the petitioner’s due process claim here,
created a potential (albeit limited) window for procedural due process claims where immigrant
respondents’ inability to procure counsel results in a fundamentally unfair proceeding.60
However, the Aguilera-Enriquez dissent highlights the shortcomings of a case-by-case
“fundamental fairness” analysis.61 Justice DeMascio argued that “because the consequences of a

54

Aguilera-Enriquez, supra note 19; see also Walter S. Gindin, Note, (Potentially) Resolving the Ever-Present Debate
Over Whether Noncitizens in Removal Proceedings Have a Due-Process Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 96
IOWA L. REV. 669, 679-80 (2011).
55
Aguilera-Enriquez, supra note 19, at 567.
56
Id. at 568.
57
Id. (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)).
58
Id. at 569.
59
Id. at 568.
60
Gindin, supra note 54, at 680.
61
Aguilera-Enriquez, supra note 19, at 571-72 (DeMascio, J., dissenting).

10

deportation proceeding parallels punishment for crime, only a per se rule requiring appointment of
counsel will assure a resident alien due process of law.”62 Justice DeMascio critiqued the
majority’s case-by-case approach to fundamental fairness, emphasizing that procedural due
process cannot be ensured without a constitutional guarantee of counsel.63 Moreover, the
dissenting opinion noted:
When the government, with plenary power to exclude, agrees to allow an alien lawful resident,
it is unconscionable for the government to unilaterally terminate that agreement without
affording an indigent resident alien assistance of appointed counsel. Expulsion is such lasting
punishment that meaningful due process can require no less. Assuredly, it inflicts punishment
as grave as the institutionalization which follow an In re Gault finding of delinquency. A
resident alien’s right to due process should not be tempered by a classification of the
deportation proceeding as “civil”, “criminal”, or “administrative.” No matter the classification,
deportation is punishment, pure and simple.64
Yet, even as courts conceptually recognize that Fifth Amendment principles of due process and
fundamental fairness may require a right to counsel in immigration proceedings, courts’ reluctance
to adopt the Aguilera test, to confer this right onto immigrants, and to hold unconstitutional those
provisions of the INA that constructively restrict noncitizens’ access to counsel has its most
detrimental effects on those least capable of representing themselves—children.65
C. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) proposes minimum
universal standards for the protection of children’s human rights, particularly in the context of

62

Id. at 573 (DeMascio, J., dissenting).
Id. at 574 (DeMascio, J., dissenting).
64
Id. at 572. Although dissenting opinion in Aguilera-Enriquez emphasizes the petitioner’s former legal residency as
a basis for his entitlement to due process, Id. at 572-74, the Supreme Court has long recognized that immigrants are
entitled to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ constitutional protections. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.
228 (1896). Thus, Justice DeMascio’s argument extends to immigrant respondents without legal status, as well.
Aguilera-Enriquez, supra note 20, at 571-72 (DeMascio, J., dissenting).
65
Immigrants represented by counsel are fifteen times more likely to seek qualified relief under the INA, and five
times more like to be granted relief from deportation than those without representation. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven
Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015). Despite the
Supreme Court’s decision guaranteeing due process to immigrants over one hundred years ago, Yamataya v. Fisher,
189 U.S. 86 (1903), immigrants who face educational, linguistic, or financial obstacles to legal representation continue
to be denied full access to counsel and fundamentally fair proceedings. Gindin, supra note 55, at 679.
63
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migration.66 The CRC identifies refugee children as independent “rights-bearers” entitled to the
protection and assistance of receiving governments, intergovernmental organizations, and
nongovernmental organizations.67 Furthermore, the CRC recognizes refugee children’s need for
special safeguards and care, interpreted contextually with relation to “[the child’s] interactions
with her specific sociocultural environment and in relation to her developmental experiences.”68
Scholars and politicians have been unable to consistently define the concept of a “refugee
child,” and this lack of consensus has resulted in the marginalization of refugee children in
humanitarian discourse.69 Traditional conceptions of the nuclear family have perceived children
as an arm of the biological family and not as individuals entitled to their own human rights
protections.70 Indeed, immigration law reflects traditional conceptions of children as dependent
beings within the biological family unit in its reliance on the biological determinants of a familial
relationship instead of the functional determinants that satisfy the day-to-day needs of the child.71
In Reno v. Flores, the Supreme Court affirmed its adherence to these traditional conceptions
when it examined the INA’s limitations on the custodial release of juvenile immigrant detainees.72
Regulations provided that “alien juveniles ‘shall be released, in order of preference, to: (i) a parent;
(ii) a legal guardian; or (iii) an adult relative (brother, sister, aunt, uncle, grandparent) who are not

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, ART. 22. (“States Parties shall take appropriate
measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is considered a refugee in accordance with
applicable international or domestic law and procedures shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her
parents or by any other person, receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of
applicable rights set forth in the present Convention and in other international human rights or humanitarian
instruments to which the said States are Parties.”).
67
Id.
68
Jeanette A. Lawrence, Agnes. E. Dodds, Ida Kaplan, & Maria M. Tucci, The Rights of Refugee Children and the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 8 LAWS 20, 2 (2019) (Austl.).
69
Id.
70
Shani M. King, U.S. Immigration Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of Family: Toward a Functional
Definition of Family that Protects Children’s Fundamental Human Rights, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 509, 511
(2010).
71
Id.
72
Reno v. Flores, 506 U.S. 292, 294 (1993).
66
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presently in INS detention,’ unless the INS determine[d] that ‘the detention of such juvenile is
required to secure his timely appearance . . . or to ensure the juvenile’s safety or that of others.’”73
A class of juvenile detainees sought release from government custody into the care of a “willingand-able private custodian,” arguing that the regulation violated both substantive and procedural
due process by not requiring a case-by-case examination of whether release “to some other
‘responsible adult’” was in the child’s best interests.74 The Court affirmed the traditional rationale,
holding that “where a juvenile has no available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, where the
conditions of governmental custody are decent and humane, [government] custody surely does not
violate the Constitution.”75 The Court continued on to say that “[t]he best interests of the child’ is
likewise not an absolute and exclusive constitutional criterion for the government’s exercise of the
custodial responsibilities that it undertakes. . . .”76
Moreover, the United States is the only country that has not ratified the CRC.77 Up until
2015, the only two other countries that had not ratified the CRC were Somalia and South Sudan,
nations with dismal human rights records.78 The debate over the ratification of the CRC has
prompted federalism concerns in the United States, where certain procedural and substantive rights
guaranteed to children can be consistent with state-regulated family law.79 However, in practice,
“the Tenth Amendment, reserving to the several States the powers not delegated to the United
States, does not limit the power to make treaties or other agreements,” and, as such, has not

73

Id. at 297 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 242.24(b)(1) (1992)).
Id. at 300.
75
Id. at 303.
76
Id. at 304.
77
Sarah Mehta, There’s Only One Country that Hasn’t Ratified the Convention on Children’s Rights: US, ACLU
(November 20, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/human-rights/treaty-ratification/theres-only-one-country-hasntratified-convention-childrens.
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uniformly prevented the signing and ratification of treaties historically.80 As such, while the CRC
outlines a minimal framework for the rights of the child, it serves more as a theoretical guide for
scholars as opposed to a legal mandate for the American legal system.81 However, some scholars
retain a belief in the conceptual utility of the CRC for U.S. policy, even absent its ratification. 82
III.

ACADEMIC REVIEW
Nationally and internationally, scholars and advocates have argued for a right to counsel for

children in immigration proceedings. The following sections provide a brief overview of the two
leading arguments in support of this right: a due process argument and a child-rights argument.
A. THE DUE PROCESS APPROACH
The most prevalent argument for a government-funded right to counsel for children is based
on the assertion that the deprivation of counsel is an inherent violation of the child’s due process
rights.83 The law governing the evolution of juvenile delinquency proceedings has been instructive
in this regard.84 Unlike the juvenile delinquency law that grants children limited autonomy while
simultaneously affording them special protections, immigration law neither entitles children to the
full rights granted to children in other areas of the law nor grants them the protections otherwise
afforded in those contexts. Like the juvenile court system, the immigration courts treat eighteen as
the age of majority, and to a certain degree, immigration law has recognized age as categorically
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distinguishing the needs of children from those of adults. 85 Further, in the context of juvenile
rights, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the “acceptance of juvenile courts distinct from
the adult criminal justice system assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be treated
differently from adults.”86 However, immigration law’s failure to distinguish between adults and
children with regard to procedural accommodations relevant to those distinct needs effectively
diminishes children’s access to the due process rights to which they are entitled.87
Indeed, the Court’s position in Bellotti v. Baird has provided much of the basis for the argument
that due process demands a government-funded right to counsel for children in immigration law.88
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute
that required parental consent in order for a minor to access an abortion.89 The Court conceded
that “although children generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against
governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account
for children’s vulnerability” and can “limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the
making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences.”90 Given the
severity of the abortion decision and the long-term ramifications of not being able to access an
abortion, the Court found the statute unconstitutional where it would restrict access to a remedy
even where a minor was deemed mature, competent, and entitled to make the decision.91 The
Court’s decision acknowledged that a qualified right does not necessarily provide an effective
avenue to access that right, particularly to children who, due to age, are legally vulnerable.92 Given
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the emphasis on the long-term consequences, the Court’s logic underscores the importance of the
accessibility of a right in determining a statute’s constitutionality.93 Thus, some scholars have
argued that any right to counsel granted to children by the INA is purely theoretical where most
children in immigration proceedings will be unable to procure or afford counsel.94
B. THE CHILD-RIGHTS APPROACH
Some scholars have argued for a children’s right to counsel in immigration proceedings based
on children’s autonomy and their fundamental distinction from adults.95 Child-rights, as a legal
basis for children’s right to counsel, is founded upon international law’s recognition of the
children’s autonomy and fundamental human rights.96
The historical development of child rights has traced children’s legal existence from being
parental property to existing as somewhat-independent persons.97 Human rights theory provides
the foundation for the assertion of child rights, centering entitlement to certain rights on children’s
personhood and, thus, qualifying children as rights holders, “even in instances where the child may
lack capacity to exercise rights autonomously.”98 Given the broad scope and the magnitude with
which the CRC has been accepted globally for its approach to children’s human rights, scholars
and policy makers often look to the CRC as a guiding conceptual framework for the analyses of
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the treatment of children in the U.S.99 More specifically, the CRC provides four key principles
through which to assess the treatment of children’s rights: non-discrimination in Article 2; the best
interests of the child in Article 3; the right to participation in Article 12; and the right to life,
survival, and development in Article 6.100
First, the CRC’s non-discrimination principle dictates that all children be treated equal,
regardless of citizenship status or national origin.101 Despite there being no express policies
directed at the disparate treatment of noncitizen children, the reality is that migrant children are
perceived by the law, first, as “aliens” and, then, as children.102 The treatment of children under
immigration law, as a result, deprives children of the protections available to American citizen
children in other areas of the law, such as a right to counsel in juvenile court.103 Thus, the
unavailability of this right to children in immigration proceedings effectively discriminates against
noncitizen children based on their citizenship status.104
Second, with the exception of SIJS, there is no provision of the INA that requires immigration
officials to consider the best interests of the child in making an immigration determination.105
Moreover, noncitizen children do not have an inherent right to participate in immigration
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proceedings.106 “Adults and decision-makers must be equally mindful to carry out their duties on
both sides of this spectrum: to adequately fulfill younger, or more dependent children’s right to
participate while also respecting more mature children’s ability to carry and express their own
views.”107 Where the CRC emphasizes children’s agency and simultaneous need for protections,
U.S. immigration law does not reflect this ideal.108
Finally, a child’s right to development and survival is particularly implicated in the context of
family separation and detention practices.109 There are limited protections available for migrant
children who meet the INA’s stringent eligibility requirements for “refugee” status110 and for
victims of trafficking, but the vast majority of migrant children do not qualify for these
protections.111 Children’s legal, physical, and mental health needs are jeopardized under the
current U.S. immigration regime,112 and scholars advocating for a child-rights approach suggest a
critical need for reform in the best interests of children regardless of nationality.113
In sum, the child-rights approach to immigration policy calls for the recognition of children’s
independent rights while also protecting their need for protection and assistance.114 Using the CRC
as a theoretical framework against which to analyze U.S. immigration policy, scholars critically
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point to the law’s disregard for children’s independent rights except in the cases of unaccompanied
children who are treated wholly as adults115 and to its inconsistency with international norms for
the protection of all children, regardless of whether they are migrants are citizens.116
IV.

IMMIGRATION LAW AND CHILDREN’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL
This paper takes a distinct approach to finding a right to government-funded counsel for

children in immigration proceedings. Where criminal courts provide a right-to-counsel for all
criminal defendants because of costs of deprivation of liberty and delinquency courts afford a right
to counsel to incompetent minors based on their cognitive abilities, immigration courts have only
begun to recognize the need for counsel for mentally incompetent respondents. The Supreme Court
recognizes that a child’s mental capacity and cognitive development categorically distinguish him
from an adult and require special procedural protections, but immigration law has not yet
implemented the necessary changes to address children’s vulnerabilities. This paper argues that
children’s cognitive development, in addition to the Supreme Court’s recognition of a
constitutional mandate for additional procedural due process protections for children, demands a
right to counsel for children in immigration proceedings.
A. CHILDREN AND CRIMINAL LAW
Over the course of the twentieth century, the historical development of a right to counsel in
criminal proceedings demonstrated an increasing recognition of the potential prejudicial and
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disparate impacts that lack of legal representation could have on criminal defendants.117 The Court
has evolved from declaring a constitutional right to counsel only where an indigent defendant is
charged with a capital offense118 to upholding a right to counsel for all defendants charged of any
crime that risks “that actual deprivation of a person’s liberty.”119 Indeed, in extending an
unequivocal right to counsel in felony proceedings, the Court in Gideon v. Wainwright stated:
“[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that, in our adversary system of criminal justice,
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him. . . . [O]ur state and national constitutions and laws have laid great
emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial
tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized
if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”120
Even before the Court guaranteed a right to counsel for all criminal defendants facing a loss of
liberty, the Court began to recognize that certain circumstances could give rise to a heightened
demand for the appointment of counsel.121 Specifically, the Court in Wade v. Mayo122
acknowledged that young and mentally incompetent individuals would require the appointment of
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counsel in criminal proceedings because “[t]here are some individuals who, by reason of age,
ignorance or mental capacity are incapable of representing themselves adequately in a prosecution
of a relatively simple nature . . . [and] [w]here such incapacity is present, the refusal to appoint
counsel is a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.”123 Thus, the evolution
of the Court’s treatment of a right to counsel presents two major points. First, the transition to a
more generalized recognition of a right to counsel, rooted in a belief that fundamental fairness
cannot be achieved in a system where the layman is expected to defend himself against the
expertise of an experienced government attorney, demonstrates the Court’s willingness to expand
the scope of an individual’s right to counsel where due process rights are at risk.124 Second, the
Court has recognized that individuals’ abilities to access a fundamentally fair court proceeding
could be impaired by such factors as age,125 ignorance, or mental competency.126
Since Wade v. Mayo, the Court has further elaborated on the mitigating effects of age and
competency on culpability in the juvenile-criminal context.127 Indeed, the Court has acknowledged
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the fundamental neurological and psychological differences between juveniles and adults and
conceded that a juvenile’s culpability and, consequentially, punishment cannot be equated to that
of an adult.128 Juveniles are ill-equipped to assess the nature of the consequences of certain choices,
ill-experienced to have the judgment to avoid detrimental choices, and not competent to defend
themselves before the law.129 Juveniles’ abilities to advocate on their own behalf and comprehend
their interests are notably impaired because of their age, particularly in situations where the
juvenile can be susceptible to coercion or duress.130 “The law has historically reflected the same
assumption that children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and
possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them.”131 As such, the criminal
courts have categorically distinguished children and juveniles from adults in this context.132
B. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY COURTS
Wade v. Mayo presented the Court’s first unequivocal affirmation in the criminal right-tocounsel context that children have categorically distinct due process needs by virtue of their age.133
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Recognizing youth as a disadvantage that compromises a defendant’s ability to adequately represent
himself, the Court determined that the defendant was “an inexperienced youth incapable of
adequately representing himself even in a trial which apparently involved no complicated legal
questions.”134 Thus, the denial of appointed counsel denied him of due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment.135 This 1948 decision preceded the Court’s decision in Gideon, suggesting
that the Court has long recognized age to be a pivotal factor in the determination of procedural
fairness.136 However, the Court did not extend procedural due process protections to juvenile
delinquency proceedings until almost two decades later.137
In the 1960s, the federal courts began to examine questions of the scope of the constitutional
rights afforded to children in juvenile court proceedings.138 In Kent v. United States, the Court
declined to declare that the same protections afforded to adults in criminal proceedings would
apply to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings.139 It nonetheless conceded: “There is
evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections afforded to adults nor the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children.”140 One year later, the Court extended this view
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even further, doing away with the distinction between adult and juvenile proceedings where the
loss of liberty is at stake.141 In In re Gault, the Court reasoned that a juvenile needs the assistance
of a counsel to navigate the complex processes of a legal proceeding, to ensure procedural fairness,
and to mount an effective defense where the consequences could curtail the child’s freedom.142 As
such, the Court conferred a right to government-funded counsel in juvenile delinquency
proceedings as a requirement for due process.143
Since then, debates surrounding theories of justice in the quasi-criminal context of juvenile
proceedings continue to raise questions around the fairness of procedures that do not afford children
all of the protections available to adults in criminal proceedings.144 As Benjamin Good has
observed, the juvenile court system often finds itself balancing two competing conceptions of the
State-child relationship: the view that a child is dependent on the State as parens patriae and that
the State has the duty to protect the child’s best interests, and the position that a child is the State’s
adversary where the child has violated some social responsibility.145 Indeed, this paradox of the
juvenile delinquency system has both propelled the expansion of legal protections to children while
limiting the Court’s treatment of children’s entitlement to all legal protections.146
However, some scholars argue that, even where the Court has expanded procedural protections
to children in juvenile court, procedural justice requires a standard specific to the needs of children
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instead of a mere extension of the adult standard.147 The fundamental basis for the distinction
between adults and children in criminal and juvenile proceedings has been that age and maturity
are critical determinants of a child’s capacity to stand trial.148 “The ongoing process of adolescent
development can amplify mental illness or intellectual disabilities that are already affecting a
youth’s competence. And the developmental immaturity alone can raise concerns about a youth’s
competence to stand trial.”149 Thus, the role of an attorney in advocating on behalf of a child goes
beyond solely mounting an effective legal defense.150 Attorneys often have to account for
inconsistent client information resulting from impaired memory and comprehension151 and
emotional stress and trauma that impacts a child’s ability to process information and make
decisions,152 and must then be able to communicate complex legal information to a less-thancompetent juvenile client.153
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Although the juvenile courts, which are technically civil forums, now recognize a right to
counsel based on children’s inherent developmental limitations, this right has not been extended
to another class of quasi-criminal, civil proceedings—immigration courts.154 Neither adults nor
children are afforded a judicially-recognized right to counsel in immigration court notwithstanding
that the possibility of removal poses the risk of a deprivation of liberty in the event of an adverse
immigration decision.155 Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recognition of a categorical distinction
between children and adults has not translated into meaningful procedural changes or protections
for children in the immigration context.156 This inconsistency in the legal treatment of children
both deprives children of due process and of their unique human rights, but the immigration courts
are increasingly recognizing that mental incompetency drastically impacts a respondent’s access
to relief,157 which presents the immigration courts the opportunity to expand its interpretation of
mental incompetency to include children’s limited developmental capacities.
C. MATTER OF M-A-M- AND MENTAL COMPETENCY IN IMMIGRATION
COURT
The respondent in Matter of M-A-M- was a Jamaican citizen who was lawfully admitted to the
United States as a child but who was served a Notice to Appear158 charging him with removability
based on multiple convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude in 2008.159 The respondent had
been diagnosed with schizophrenia and indicated that he required medication, had not been treated
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while detained, and wished to see a psychiatrist.160 The court denied his requests for
accommodations for his mental illness, including a change of venue to be located closer to his
attorney and family.161 Although initially indicating that he was unable to represent himself, the
respondent eventually said that he “believed” that he could answer the questions put to him by the
judge and the DHS attorney, and the Immigration Judge proceeded with the merits hearing where
respondent appeared pro se.162 At the commencement of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) appeal, there was no indication that the respondent had ever seen a psychiatrist, and,
through counsel, the respondent’s argument rested on the Immigration Judge’s failure to properly
assess his mental competency.163
On review, the BIA examined three principles issues: “(1) When should Immigration Judges
make competency determinations? (2) What factors should Immigration Judges consider and what
procedures should they employ to make those determinations? (3) What safeguards should
Immigration Judges prescribe to ensure that proceedings are sufficiently fair when competency is
not established?”164 The BIA submitted that, although immigration proceedings are civil in nature,
the well-developed criminal law treatment of mental competency would be instructive to the
questions of competency in immigration law.165 As such, the BIA adopted the Supreme Court’s
definition of mental incompetency almost verbatim,166 stating that “the test for determining
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whether an alien is competent to participate in immigration proceedings is whether he or she has
a rational and factual understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings, can consult with
the attorney or representative if there is one, and has a reasonable opportunity to examine and
present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.”167
As a threshold matter, the BIA affirmed that all respondents have a presumption of competency
that can only be rebutted “if an Immigration Judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the respondent is unable because of a mental disorder to perform any of the functions listed in the
definition of competence to represent oneself.”168 Competence is not an observable incapacity in
and of itself but, rather, is indicated by behavioral signs that a person may lack the ability to
perform a function demanded in a particular situation.169 Indicia of incompetency could include
observations of certain behaviors, such as the inability to stay on topic or a high level of distraction,
or other evidence of mental illness or incompetence, such as medical reports, past judicial, medical,
or school assessments, or affidavits from friends and family.170
Prior to M-A-M-, the INA prescribed safeguards for mentally incompetent individuals where
it would be impracticable for the person to be present at the proceeding.171 The INA required
additional safeguards for unaccompanied and incompetent individuals and prevented immigration
judges from accepting admissions of removability.
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However, the INA did not provide a

framework for assessing the competency of the individual and, as such, left determinations of
mental competency up to the discretion of individual judges.173 The BIA decision in Matter of M-
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A-M-, in this regard, provided the immigration courts with the first such framework that limited
the practicable identification of incompetent respondents.174
Despite expanding the protections for mentally incompetent individuals, Matter of M-A-Mlimited an immigration judge’s duties in cases of possible incompetency to the simple requirement
of an assessment of competency and the implementation of safeguards.175 A competency
assessment could constitute a psychiatric evaluation or simply a series of simple questions to the
respondent, and remains within the discretion of the individual immigration judge.176 Similarly,
the BIA did not prescribe minimum requirements for the safeguards to be implemented to protect
the interests of an incompetent respondent.177 So, while Matter of M-A-M- provides only limited
protections for individuals who are unable to participate in their claims for relief, the BIA decision
puts forth a vague definition of competency that could potentially be expansive enough to include
children, whose cognitive development renders them unable to fulfill all of the functions required
of an immigration proceeding.178
V. A SCIENCE-BASED ARGUMENT FOR A RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Research has repeatedly confirmed that many juveniles and most children under the age of
fourteen are not competent to understand legal proceedings and participate in the defense of their
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claims for relief.179 Given the quasi-adversarial nature of immigration proceedings and the BIA’s
reliance on criminal and juvenile delinquency law in treating the issue of competency, immigration
law’s reluctance to extend special procedural safeguards to children runs counter to accepted legal
authority on the issue. Moreover, immigration law largely ignores accepted scientific evidence that
juveniles as a whole lack the biological development necessary to understand and access their
rights without the guaranteed assistance of a qualified adult, here legal counsel. Children’s capacity
to appear coherent at an immigration proceeding does not equate to competency to understand the
proceeding or its implications, and reliance on an immigration judge to make that distinction puts
the task of evaluating a child’s psychosocial performance in the hands of an individual whose
expertise lies in the law.
Children’s competency can be influenced by any number of factors, such as cognitive and
intellectual abilities, mental health disorders, their development, and their behavior.180 The bases
for indicating incompetency can be influenced by physical disabilities; educational and cultural
backgrounds; language, vocabulary, and comprehension, trauma and migration-related factors,
and custodial placement and post-release accommodations.181 Needless to say, the assessment of
mental competency and capacities of a migrant child, who more often than not cannot even
communicate with an immigration judge in the same language,182 are critically impaired within
the framework provided by the BIA in Matter of M-A-M-. A migrant child’s access to relief should
not be vested in an immigration judge’s limited ability to assess the complex and nuanced nature
of a child’s mental state, particularly where significant numbers of those children are
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unaccompanied, have suffered some form of trauma, have low-educational levels, and may have
other underlying mental health issues.183 Rather, the scientific knowledge available about
children’s limited capacities should compel the provision of legal safeguards that guarantee
children procedural due process vis-à-vis a right to counsel.184
The brains of juveniles are biologically distinct from those of adults.185 Adolescence marks the
most dynamic period of brain development for juveniles.186 Throughout adolescence, the brain
undergoes the process of strengthening connections among its different regions, despite the brain’s
physical development being almost complete.187 Scientists have used a variety of magnetic
resonance imaging (“MRI”) technologies, such as the structural MRI, diffusion tensor imaging
(DTI), and functional MRI to verify theories about the developmental stage of adolescence and
structural and neural changes in the brain, as well as to analyze the real-time responses of subjects
to stimuli.188 Specifically, examinations of the prefrontal cortex (“PFC”) reveal that it takes longer
for the PFC to develop than other areas of the brain and that “the subcortical basal ganglia are
implicated in numerous functions,” such as behavior selection and cognitive coordination.189
Scientists have demonstrated that the relatively late development of the PFC is linked to
the maturation of its connections with impulse-generating and emotion-gathering parts of the
brain,190 and juveniles in the adolescent stage of development do not have the same physiological
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brain functions as an adult.191 Indeed, studies indicate that “adult brains specialize particular
prefrontal regions for certain tasks, whereas children’s prefrontal areas function more diffusely,
suggesting that neurological development involves both changes within brain regions and among
their connections.”192 Furthermore, delayed development of the frontal regions of the brain cause
adolescents to rely heavily on the parts of the brain housing emotional, instead of rational, controls
when assessing circumstances and making decisions.193
As Laurence Steinberg’s analysis of the juvenile brain succinctly put it, “[a]dolescent
immaturity may affect their behavior as defendants in ways that extend beyond competence.”194
Juveniles’ minds are unstable, at best, unpredictable, at worst, and unreliable in even understanding
their own best interests in contexts beyond the scope of their comprehension.
The adolescent’s cognitive, psychological, social, and moral development is not
simply a matter of life experience: It has a significant biological basis. New medical
imaging techniques, such as PET scans and functional MRI, are starting to reveal
aspects of brain development that take place during adolescence. One is the
maturation of the frontal lobe that oversees high-level cognitive tasks such as
hypothetical thinking, logical reasoning, long-range planning, and complex
decision making. We now know that during adolescence, the frontal lobe is a hub
of activity: Neurons are wrapping themselves in myelin sheaths that speed the
transmission of electrical impulses, while the “pruning” of unneeded synaptic
connections is increasing the efficiency of mental processing. Elsewhere in the
brain, the limbic system—the center of emotional processing—is increasing its
connections, paving the way for a better integration of emotional and cognitive
processes.195
In addition, external elements that affect children’s capacities, cognition, and overall
development are extremely influential in determining their responses in high-stress situations
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requiring consequential decision-making concerning unfamiliar subject-matter.196 Developmental
traumatology has been instructive here, demonstrating the physiological effects of stress on a child
brain development.197 In spite of this knowledge, DHS, ORR, and immigration enforcement
agencies have not adequately addressed or accommodated the unique needs of the children in their
care.198 The Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) reported in September 2019
that the mental health care needs of children in ORR custody exceeded the current capacity of
children’s care providers.199 The DHHS reported in September 2019 that the mental health care
needs of children in ORR custody exceeded the current capacity of children’s care providers.200
And yet, these children are held to the same legal standards as adults, presumed competent
to represent their best legal interests and to defend their rights to relief, under the guise of
fundamental fairness and due process. The combined developmental, psychosocial, intellectual,
and traumatic/emotional experiences of children uniquely entitle them to special protections that
are necessary to guarantee them due process. The presumption of competency that extends to
children in immigration proceedings ignores the very biology underlying the baseline differences
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between children and adults—age, and the developmental differences resulting from age. This
presumption of competency assumes that children and adults are equally positioned to fully
understand their circumstances and claims of relief and articulate their best defenses. This simply
is biologically impossible. As such, even if an immigration judge assesses a child’s indicia of
competency to be normal behavior when measured against the average child, those indicia still
demonstrate a limited capacity to rationally and factually understand and participate in their
proceedings when compared to an adult.201 The contradictory rationales that the immigration
courts have continued to use to justify denying children a right to government-funded counsel
simultaneously denies the science applicable to child development and competency.
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS
As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he unique role in our society of the family, the institution

by which we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural,
requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs
of parents and children.”202 The lack of accommodations in immigration procedures for children’s
unique vulnerabilities deviates from the Court’s body of holdings recognizing that children are
developmentally different and have unique constitutional needs compared to adults.203 The only
way to adequately conform to the principles established by the Court is to change the procedures
and limited protections currently in place for children.
The INA and the BIA’s holdings have established a framework of rules and procedures that
are wholly inadequate to guaranteeing children fundamentally fair proceedings and procedural due

VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE’S UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN PROGRAM, supra note 180 (“A child may be capable
of performing a task in an ideal situation, but some contexts, such as a legal setting, may place so much pressure on a
child or present so many cultural barriers that it impacts his or her capacity to perform the task . . . .”).
202
Baird, supra note 86, at 633 (internal citations omitted).
203
See, e.g. Wade v. Mayo, supra note 9; Roper v. Simmons, supra note 9; In re Gault, supra note 20.
201

34

process of law. The following recommendations seek to address a few of the most egregiously
unjust attributes of immigration’s legal framework. First and foremost, because children are
categorically unable to represent themselves in a legal proceeding, Congress should amend the
INA to provide a right to government-funded counsel for all children under the age of eighteen,
the age of legal maturity. Despite the BIA’s insistence on a presumption of competency for all
immigration respondents, children are insufficiently cognitively developed to understand,
participate in, and represent their interests in a proceeding with ramifications as serious as those
in immigration. As such, the BIA should remove any presumption of competency for children,
train judges to appropriately handle cases with children, and immediately implement a process to
assess the need for procedural and psychological safeguards. These could include the appointment
of a guardian ad litem for younger children, in addition to their counsel, a change of venue to a
less adversarial setting, or assignment of cases to a judge with special training in children’s cases.
While the more specific needs of children will vary according to their age, their levels of trauma,
or the cultures and language, for example, the only way of guaranteeing that these needs are
accommodated, and their rights are accessed is through the unconditional appointment of counsel.
Immigration law’s treatment of children disregards the special protections guaranteed to
children in other areas of the country’s legal system. In addition to the political, racial, and cultural
implications of continuing to deny immigrant children fair access and representation before the
law, this paper provides a constitutional argument for a child’s right to counsel in immigration
proceedings, using the Supreme Court’s own precedents and legal treatment of children to
highlight the brazen inconsistencies in the treatment of immigrant children. A right to counsel will
provide immigrant children with the procedural due process of law guaranteed to them by
Constitution and withheld from them by immigration law.
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